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recipient will have no cause for complaint. This means that if
the broker performs services under an exclusive listing contract,
the fact that he did not bind himself so to perform cannot be
relied upon by the owner as a basis for escaping his own obli-
gation.
This treatment of the exclusive listing contract is in keeping
with the majority view at common law, which holds that where
an agent has expended time, effort or money in attempting to
secure a purchaser, the owner of the real estate will be bound
by the listing agreement, for the consideration necessary to
support his promise has been supplied.'
2
It may be conceded that from a practical viewpoint the deci-
sion in this case is sound. However, the reasoning employed by





Decedent's mother and the nephew of his concubine claimed
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act as his
dependents. The mother was found to be partially dependent
and, in the absence of definite proof of greater contributions to
her support by the deceased, was given the statutory minimum.
Compensation to the nephew was resisted on the grounds that
the nephew was not decedent's child or a member of his family,
and, alternatively, that he was in a deferred class, whose claim
to compensation was dependent upon the absence of a member
of higher rank. Held, (1) the nephew was a wholly dependent
of decedent's family, and (2) the presence of a partial dependent
of a higher rank did not preclude compensation to a total depen-
dent of a lower rank, even if Sections 1231, 1232, 1251 and 1252
of the Workmen's Compensation Act establish .and rank classes.
Patin v. T. L. James & Company, Incorporated, 218 La. 949, 51
So. 2d 586 (1951).
The supreme court admitted that a reading of Section 1232
alone would lead to the conclusion that the minor was barred
from recovery. However, it held that the first sentence of Section




1231,1 and both Sections 12322 and 12513 in their entirety, apply
only to total dependents, that the second sentence of Section
12314 and Section 12535 apply to partial dependents, and that
Section 12526 applies to both partial and total dependents. This
1. La. R.S. 23:1231: "For injury causing death within one year after the
accident there shall be paid to the legal dependents of the employee, actually
and wholly dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of the acci-
dent and death, a weekly sum as hereinafter provided, for a period of three
hundred weeks."
2. La. R.S. 23:1232: "Payment to dependents shall be computed and
divided among them on the following basis:
"(1) If the widow or widower alone, thirty-two and one-half per centum
of wages.
"(2) If the widow or widower and one child, forty-six and one-quarter
per centum of wages.
"(3) If the widow or widower and two or more children, sixty-five per
centum of wages.
"(4) If one child alone, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages of
deceased.
"(5) If two children, forty-six and one-quarter per centum of wages.
"(6) If three or more children, sixty-five per centum of wages.
"(7) If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, then to the father
or mother, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages of the deceased. If
there are both father and mother, sixty-five per centum of wages.
"(8), If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, nor dependent par-
ent entitled to compensation, then to one brother or sister, thirty-two and
one-half per centum of wages with eleven per centum additional for each
brother or sister in excess of one. If other dependents than those enumer-
ated, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages for one, and eleven per
centum additional for each such dependent in excess of one, subject to a
maximum of sixty-five per centum of wages for all, regardless of the num-
ber of dependents."
3. La. R.S. 23:1251: "The following persons shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to be wholly and actually dependent upon the deceased employee:
"(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she is living at the time of his
accident or death.
"(2) A husband, mentally or physically incapacitated from wage earn-
ing, upon a wife with whom he was living at the time of her accident or
death.
"(3) A child under the age of eighteen years (or over eighteen years of
age, if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon the parent
with whom he is living at the time of the injury of the parent."
4. La. R.S. 23:1231: ". . . If the employee leaves legal dependents only
partially actually dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of the
accident and death, the weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal to the
same proportion of the weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly
dependent as the amount contributed by the employee to such partial depen-
dents in the year prior to his death bears to the earnings of the deceased at
the time of the accident."
5. La. R.S. 23:1253: "If there is no one whdlly dependent and more than
one person partially dependent, so much of the death benefit as each is
entitled to shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of
their dependency. No person shall be considered a dependent, unless he is a
member of the family of the deceased employee, or bearing to him the rela-
tion of husband or widow, or lineal descendant or ascendant, or brother or
sister, or child."
6. La. R.S. 23:1252: "In all other cases, the question of legal and actual
dependency in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the
facts as they may be at the time of the accident and death; In such other
cases if there are a sufficient number of persons wholly dependent to take up
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application of Section 1232 to total dependents only would require
compensation to be given to all classes until the maximum com-
pensation is exhausted or until a total dependent is found. The
presence of a total dependent, however, would preclude recovery
by a member of a subordinate class, unless it be assumed that
the supreme court, in effect, has served notice that no ranking
of dependents was intended by the legislature.7
In view of the wording and history of the statute it is difficult
to see that such a position could be validly sustained.
It is hardly questionable that the statute does create the
following classes: (1) the widow or widower and children; (2)
father or mother, or both; (3) brothers and sisters and other
dependents.
8
It was generally accepted and was held by the courts that
the presence of one or more members of a prior class precluded
any consideration of compensation for members of a lower class. 9
Furthermore, a member of a subordinate class had to allege and
prove the absence of any member of a prior class.' This often
resulted in inequities, and the courts looked for a reasonable
means to avoid such an impasse. In McDonald v. Louisiana,
Arkansas & Texas Transportation Company," the court reasoned
that the subordinate classes were to be allowed compensation
until the maximum permitted was exhausted. In Hamilton v.
Consolidated Underwriters12 it was held that dependent brothers
and sisters meeting the test of "legal dependents" were not to be
relegated to a deferred third class. The necessity of deciding
that members of such a class should receive compensation despite
the maximum compensation, the death benefit shall be divided equally among
them, and persons partially dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof."
7. The supreme court, at least twice, conceded only for argument that
the statute establishes and ranks classes. See 218 La. 949, 959, 963, 51 So. 2d
586, 590 (1951).
8. Supra note 2.
9. Brown v. Weber-King Lbr. Co., 7 La. App. 444 (1928); Dugas v. Gulf
State Utilities Co., 145 So. 376 (La. App. 1933).
10. Brown v. Weber-King Lbr. Co., 7 La. App. 444 (1928). However, com-
pensation was allowed to dependent parents' if the widow was neither living
with nor dependent on decedent at the time of his death. Bradley v. Swift
& Co., 167 La. 249, 119 So. 37 (1928); Evans v. Big Chain Stores, Inc., 133 So.
487 (La. App. 1931); Henderson v. City of Shreveport, 26 So. 2d 766 (La.
App. 1946). In the absence of parents'a sister could claim. Powell v. Para-
mount-Richards Theatres, Inc., 22 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 1945). A surviving
child not entitled to compensation would not bar deferred claimants. Jones
v. Dendinger, Inc., 147 So. 732 (La. App. 1933) (parents); Harvey v. Caddo
DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., Inc., 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942) (sister).
11. 28 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 1946).
12. 21 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 1944).
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the presence of a member of a prior class was obviated. At any
rate, the court did, under the circumstances, allow those naturally
falling in Class 3 to receive compensation when Class 2 was
represented.
13
Even though both the Orleans 14 and the First Circuit 15 Courts
of Appeal had adopted the attitude that the statute had created
classes and ranked them, the latter, relying at least in part on
the denial of certiorari in the McDonald case and the granting of
certiorari in the Williams v. Jahncke Service, Incorporated,
case, 6 changed its position to that of the Second Circuit. 7
A number of possible combinations of the classes present
themselves:
(1) a total dependent of a prior class and a partial dependent
of a subordinate class. Subject to the possibilities that the
supreme court will eliminate any ranking of classes and that the
court may determine that the partial dependent is a "legal depen-
dent,' u 8 the partial dependent will receive nothing.
(2) A total dependent of a prior class and a total dependent
of a subordinate class. The same position and the same caveats
as in (1) above would seem to be valid.
(3) A partial dependent of a prior class and a partial depen-
dent of a subordinate class. Since it seems that all ranking of
partial dependents has been eliminated, the latter would not be
barred from compensation.
(4) A partial dependent of a prior class and a total depen-
dent of a subordinate class. This is the instant case. Compensa-
tion to the subordinate dependent is allowable.
The decision is sound from both social and economic view-
points. So long as the maximum is not encroached upon there
13. The decision rested upon the interpretation given the statute in
Archibald v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So. 2d 492 (1942).
The result seems to be that the "legal dependents" of Section 1231 becomes
a "floating" group not subject to permanent classification.
14. Archibald v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 20 So. 2d 178 (La. App.
1944); Williams v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 38 So. 2d 400 (1949).
15. Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, 24 So. 2d 213 (La.- App. 1945).
16. 38 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1949). The writ was granted and the case
disposed of on an entirely different point. See Williams v. Jahncke Service,
Inc., 217 La. 1078, 48 So. 2d 93 (1950).
17. See Patin v. T. L. James & Co., Inc., 42 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1949) and
43 So. 2d 58 (1949).
18. Archibald v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So. 2d
492 (1942).
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is no valid objection to allowing compensation to all those who
would have been receiving financial benefit from the decedent's
continued existence. The difficulty of eliminating all considera-
tion of classes and ranks lies, however, in the wording and
history of the statute.
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